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Richard Prestons The Cobra Event, which
he dedicates to public health professionals,
weaves a chilling, but compelling tale about a
lone terrorists attack on Manhattan with a
genetically engineered virus. Prestons thought-
provoking novel raises a logical question: How do
we successfully contain and combat the threat of
bioterrorism? To meet this emerging threat, we
must address four important challenges.
The first challenge is to be aware that an act
of bioterrorism could happen. Its likelihood is
entirely unknown, and an attack may never
occur. However, we have seen terrorism emerge
as one of the thorniest problems of the post-cold
war era, and we have seen that terrorists are
always searching for new weapons. We have
already seen sarin nerve gas released in the
Tokyo subway. Somewhere, sometime in the
future, terrorists may well threaten to use, or
attempt to use, a biological weapon against the
United States. When discussing the possibility of
a terrorist attack in the next few years, the
president unequivocally stated, This is not a
cause for panic. It is cause for serious, deliberate,
disciplined, long-term concern. In other words,
we must not be afraid, but we must be aware.
Once we are fully aware that bioterrorism
could happen, our second challenge is to be
prepared. That is why the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) is spending $158
million this fiscal year to prepare for bioterorrism
and why the president has proposed increasing
that investment by an additional $72 million in
his Fiscal Year 2000 budget.
This investment will fund our ongoing Anti-
Bioterrorism Initiative. To increase our level of
preparedness, the initiative is expanding its
activities in a number of key areas: surveillance,
medical and public health response, building a
stockpile of drugs and supplies, and research and
development. We are improving and strengthen-
ing the U.S. public health surveillance network
by enhancing our capability to detect and report
outbreaks, conduct epidemiologic investigations,
perform laboratory tests to identify biological
agents, and communicate necessary informa-
tion and advisories rapidly through electronic
technology.
We are enhancing our medical and public
health response capacity by spearheading an
administrationwide effort to develop infrastruc-
ture at the local level by establishing in major
American cities medical response teams to deal
with the consequences of bioterrorism. We are
also expanding our capacity to provide prophy-
laxis, medical care, and infection control on a
massive scale. We are creating, and will be
maintaining, an unprecedented national stock-
pile of drugs and vaccines for civilian use in case
of a bioterrorist attack.
Finally, we are accelerating our research and
development of rapid diagnostics, drugs, and
vaccines, so we can more effectively address the
threats and consequences of a bioterrorist
attack. In addition, we will continue our work on
the genome sequencing of organisms most likely
to be used as bioweapons, so that we can not only
quickly identify the biological agent, but also
develop effective therapies. Our efforts in
surveillance, medical and public health re-
sponse, stockpile provision, and research and
development will increase significantly our
preparedness for bioterrorism.
If we want to be truly prepared, our third
challenge is for the public health and medical
communities to take the lead in our fight against
bioterrorism. In a conventional terrorist attack,
local first responders, such as the police,
firefighters, and paramedics, constitute the first
line of defense. With bioterrorism, the public
health and medical communities stand directly
on the front lines. How well we respond to a
threat or attack will depend on the preparedness
of our public health and medical communities.
For example, if a bioterrorist threat is issued
perhaps someone claims to have released a
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deadly pathogen in a public placephysicians
must be able to recognize and report cases that
come to attention in emergency rooms and
doctors offices; public health officials must be
able to conduct investigations to establish the
likely site/time of exposure, the size and location
of the exposed population, and the prospects for
secondary transmission; and appropriately
traned laboratory personnel must be available to
identify the biological agent. Whether the
release of a bioweapon is announced or
surreptitious, affected persons may not have
symptoms for days or even weeks, and by then
they would be geographically dispersed. Quaran-
tine is not practical because only one biological
agentsmallpoxis communicable. Even with
smallpox, it would be impossible to know whom
to quarantine because of the spread of disease by
secondary transmission and the difficulty in
accurately identifying those who have been
exposed. A strong electronic communications
network would be needed to piece together early
reports, as well as epidemiologic and laboratory
data, to determine what had happened so that
public health and law enforcement officials can
take prompt action. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention would play an important
role in this process because of its particular
expertise in surveillance, infectious disease, and
public health. Everyonefrom the physicians
who first see victims to the scientists who
identify the infectious agentsmust coordinate
their efforts.
That brings me to the fourth, and final,
challenge: We must all work together. In the
fight against bioterrorism, the federal govern-
ment, particularly HHS, has a leadership role.
Among other things, we need to support state
and local planning efforts, provide training at
every level, develop an infrastructure for
delivering mass medical care, and offer expertise
to our communities.
This is a fight we certainly cannot win by
ourselves. Across the board, we must forge new
working partnerships among health, public
safety, and intelligence agencies. We need
unprecedented cooperation among the federal
government, state and local health agencies, and
the medical community. We must ensure that
plans for managing the medical consequences of
terrorist acts are well integrated and coordi-
nated with other emergency response systems.
Close collaborative efforts are necessary also
because microbes do not respect boundaries of
culture, language, or territory. An act of
bioterrorism cannot be contained by any national
border or barrier. When it comes to microbes, we
are not protected, in the words of the Indian poet
Tagore, by narrow domestic walls. Since these
organisms recognize no boundaries, in our battle
against them, neither can we. Because we share
a common future, we must share a common
resolve. As Dr. Gro Bruntland, the director-
general of the World Health Organization, has
said, when it comes to public health and safety,
Solutions, like the problems, have to be global...
As we work together to counter bioterrorism, we
must pool our will and our resources to meet the
challenges.